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ABSTRACT
SARAH ANSLEY CROFT: Small-Family Mindset: An Analysis of the Impact of China’s
Family Planning Policies on Family Culture

This thesis examines the impact of China’s family planning policies on women’s attitudes
towards family culture and the implications on China today. The family planning policies began
in the 1970s as an emergency measure intended to create a short-term voluntary small-family
culture by decreasing fertility rates. My research, comprised primarily of primary and secondary
qualitative sources, discusses the development and implementation of the policies, the economic
reforms beginning in the 1980s, and their joint effects on fertility rates, sex ratio at birth,
women’s liberation, and changes in family culture, particularly in rural areas. This study found
that the family planning policies and economic changes exacerbated the decline in fertility rates
and accelerated the change in cultural beliefs about the family and the role of women in society,
resulting in continued low fertility rates and the acceptance of the small-family culture in both
rural and urban areas. The lasting effects of these changes are threatening China’s socioeconomic
future, thereby requiring action from the government. While it remains to be seen which policies
the government will choose to pursue, it must consider the long-term effects and address not only
the exceptionally low fertility rates, but also the problems arising from them, for instance, the
4:2:1 problem, leftover men, and the sex ratio imbalance.
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Methodology
I was interested in learning more about the one-child policy and earlier family planning
programs in China, and particularly how they impacted women in a larger sense. I initially
wanted to examine women’s attitudes towards the family planning policies and how they
changed over time, but I quickly realized not much information is available about how women
felt towards the government’s actions because the political climate in China does not allow for
surveys or criticism of the government. I realized that at the same time these policies were being
enforced, China’s economy was being transformed into a market economy. I knew from the
language and history classes that I have taken on China, and from global news, that China is now
dealing with a huge gender imbalance and continued low fertility rates even though the one-child
policy has been repealed. I was curious to learn how the family planning policies and economic
changes worked together, how they were related to the gender imbalance and low fertility rates
facing China today, and what effects they had not only on controlling population growth but on
Chinese culture and women.
My research is qualitative, and I collected both primary and secondary sources to
understand the reasons behind the changing attitudes of women in China towards childbearing
and family planning. The majority of the secondary sources I used were journal articles
analyzing the effects of family planning policies, the history and development of the policies, as
well as trends among women over time regarding fertility and attitudes towards family planning
policies and childrearing. The primary sources I used were journal articles conveying the
findings of new research and surveys that had been conducted in China, as well as an original
documentary by Carma Hinton interviewing women in Longbow, China. Due to the nature of the
political atmosphere in China, it is difficult to conduct surveys because it is not often allowed.

1

When surveys and interviews in China are allowed, they are often accompanied by government
officials which can lead to interviewees withholding information out of fear of political
repercussions. Limited surveys and interviews with Chinese students on campus would have
been helpful, but COVID-19 has made it impossible for me to do so, which further limited this
study.
The primary focus of this paper is to evaluate what caused the changes in rural women’s
attitudes towards family planning, particularly the changes in how many children women want to
have and their views towards sons and daughters. Rural areas were slower to change than urban
areas, which by nature encourage smaller families and offer more opportunities for women.
Historically, Chinese culture emphasized large families and a preference towards sons. Large
families, with five or six children, were important in rural areas not only to working and
maintaining the family farm and land but also to preserving the family line and guaranteeing
support in the parents’ old age. Sons were preferred to daughters because they played a more
active role in society and bore responsibility as the primary providers for their family and parents
in old age. Daughters were raised to marry a suitable partner and when they married, they would
leave their family to become a part of their husbands’ family and take care of his parents. Today
in rural China, the culture has changed significantly, and the preference now is for smaller
families with only one or two children, not particularly caring if they have sons or daughters.
Alternatively, more Chinese people are choosing not to get married or not to have children at all.
This is evidenced by the decline in fertility rates over the past forty years in China, and the
continued low fertility rates even as the policies have been relaxed and repealed.
These attitude changes were a direct result of the family planning policies that began to
be implemented in the 1970s, as well as the economic reform in which China engaged in the
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1980s. Due to the stringent enforcement of the family planning policies, women began to see
what their lives would look like with fewer children and access to contraceptives, something that
had not been present in Chinese society before, but they did not have many opportunities outside
the home when policy implementation began. However, when the economic reforms started,
women, rural women, in particular, had more opportunities outside the home in education and
the labor force, which soon began to create a voluntary small-family culture because women
were enjoying their new freedoms and roles in society and did not want to return to the home.
This small-family mindset meant women’s primary focus became economic stability rather than
childbearing and rearing, as they were only having one or two children and were working more.
With more education and higher income, women desired fewer children and this was the trend
for both rural and urban women, even though there were some disparities in type of work and
level of income based on location.
The birth control policies themselves accounted for part of this shift in attitude, but the
small-family mindset lingered after the policy was relaxed and eventually repealed because the
policy implementation and the concurrent economic reforms fundamentally changed Chinese
culture by altering the space in which women occupied in society. The coercive and strict
implementation of the family planning policies of the 1970s, which often forced women to
undergo abortions, sterilizations, and intrauterine device (IUD) implementation, was a major
factor in initiating this cultural shift as it forced families to be smaller. With fewer children to
raise, women’s burden inside the home was lessened. As China engaged in opening up and
reform in the 1980s, the labor market offered women unparalleled access and they began to
significantly contribute to China’s growing economy, as well as their families. In turn, women’s
status in society was elevated and daughters began to be valued as equally as sons, who were
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historically favored. As families became reliant on only one or two children, each child became
more important to the family and the traditional belief of sons being more important to daughters
began to break down. This traditional preference was slow to change, however, leading to an
abundance of sex-selective abortions, female infanticide, and female infant abandonment under
the family planning policies. Because of this, there is a lack of women today which has also
made them inherently more valuable to society. Interviews and surveys conducted with Chinese
women revealed their changed attitudes towards family size and sex preference of their children.
As this study is qualitative and not quantitative, this correlation and association was
observed primarily through existing literature that evaluated the family planning policies, family
structure, and women’s roles in society through surveys, interviews, and limited data analysis. In
the literature, there was a clear relationship between women’s opportunities outside the home
and their attitudes towards family size and children. As women’s participation in society at large
increased, they generally desired fewer children, but this was exacerbated by the implementation
of the family planning policies that did not allow for more than a couple of children per family.
Given the sensitive political climate within China that prevents political criticism and outside
research, the available information on this topic, both from the past and today in China, is
extremely limited. While the data is limited, many of the works I used in this study documented
women’s attitudes by way of more recent surveys and interviews that demonstrated attitudes
towards the policies, women’s perspectives reflecting on the policy, and other factors impacting
their opinions. This study is limited as this relationship has not been quantitatively proven and it
is difficult to conduct unbiased and honest interviews in China, but the existing literature and
recent research show a clear relationship between the family planning policies, the market reform
policies, and the changes in women’s attitudes towards children.
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Chapter 2 gives a general overview of the development of family planning policies, the
implementation, the various responses to the policies, and the impact on fertility rates. The
family planning policies began in the 1970s primarily as political slogans encouraging families
to be smaller, but the enforcement of these policies was highly coercive. The strict enforcement
of these policies elicited resistance from families, leading to policy changes in the 1980s and the
one-child policy, which was eventually relaxed and repealed in 2013. Chapter 3 discusses the
changes in women’s attitudes as a result of the family planning policies, focusing on how the
policies liberated women from the patriarchal past of China and changed their attitudes regarding
family size. This chapter also discusses the role policy enforcement had in forming women’s
attitudes towards the small-family culture, as well as the lasting cultural changes the policies
created. Chapter 4 discusses other factors of women’s changing attitudes, including differences
in rural and urban women, as well as the changing role of women in Chinese society as a result
of the market reform and the impact of the family planning policies. Chapter 5 is the analysis and
evaluation which examines the fertility rates after the policies were relaxed, offering possible
explanations for the continued low rates as well as possible courses of action moving forward.
Finally, the conclusion summarizes the findings of the paper and presents various challenges
facing China as a result of the family planning policies, changed attitudes, and continued low
fertility rates in China.
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Chapter 2: Overview and Policy Background
Overview
In the 1970s, China began to implement family planning policies as the rapid rate of
population growth was threatening the country’s goals of development. These policies began
moderately, encouraging couples to get married later, have fewer children, and wait longer
periods between having children. While these policies were aimed at creating a voluntary smallfamily culture, they were often enforced coercively and strictly. The policy was effective in
decreasing fertility rates, as households were more likely to have two or three children, rather
than the average five or six children in the past, but it was met with widespread resistance
because of the style of enforcement. Women were subject to forced abortions, sterilizations, or
IUD implementation, as well as general invasion of privacy as the state was now involved in
women’s personal health choices. There were various forms of resistance, perhaps the most
striking being how families went around the policies, including hiding illicit pregnancies and
engaging in female infanticide so the family could have another chance at a son.
In 1979, the policies became much stricter as the infamous one-child policy began to be
implemented, giving the state power over birth planning. The consequences for violating the
policy became more severe, particularly in rural areas. Over the next twenty years, family
planning policies were slightly adjusted with social responses and policy effectiveness, and
smaller families became the standard. Even though the policy began as voluntary in name but
coercive in nature, over time, women were voluntarily choosing to have fewer children. When
the family planning policies became more relaxed, China witnessed a consistent low rate of
fertility, despite families being allowed to have more children. This is a clear demonstration of
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the more permanent cultural shift to the small-family mindset, despite the government intending
it to be a short-term shift in family size.
Over time, these family planning policies changed the culture regarding family from a
filial and agrarian mindset of having large families to a modern, collective good effort to have
small families. These policies showed women what opportunities they could have in life with
fewer children and liberated them in this sense from the burdens of mothering many children,
allowing them the time to fill a new space in society. Many women were open to having fewer
kids and supported the goal of the official policies, and looking back, multiple generations of
women have supported the government’s actions regarding family planning and thus, have
bought into the small-family mindset. However, many women did not support how the policies
were enforced, as it was often coercive, treated women as a means to an end, and left women
with intense physical and psychological distress.
The massive economic reforms that began in China in 1978 under the leadership of Deng
Xiaoping also contributed to changing the culture surrounding family planning, specifically the
attitudes of women towards having children. This opening up and reform of China created a
society in which women had more options outside of the home, leading to a decrease in the
desire to have large families. These market reforms opened up spaces for women in the labor
market and higher education, liberating them from the patriarchal history of China that expected
them to stay inside the home and raise children. As these reforms primarily took place in urban
settings, the difference between urban and rural women’s attitudes towards family planning is
evidence of the impact these changes had in shifting the overall culture to a small-family
mindset.
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As a result of the creation and implementation of China’s family planning policies from
the 1970s forward, along with China’s market reforms, the culture surrounding family planning
and childbearing was changed. Chinese women are now more inclined to embrace the smallfamily mindset and reject the traditional model of larger families to fulfill their filial duty, even
when the policies are loosened to allow for more children. China’s family planning policies not
only affected population size and demographics, but they fundamentally changed long-held
cultural beliefs on the family make-up and the role of women in society.

Development and Implementation
In 1979, the Chinese government introduced a plan to boost economic development by
creating markets. However, China’s already large population was growing too fast to sustain the
proposed economic growth, so the government created the one-child policy to curtail this
problem. It was always intended to be a “short term policy that aims to foster a voluntary culture
of small families.” (Ding & Hesketh, 2006, p. 371) Looser family planning policies had been in
place in the 1970s, and while implementation was inconsistent and largely based on party
slogans, such as “later, longer, fewer”, they were highly effective in bringing down fertility rates.
Despite this success, the one-child policy was implemented in 1979 and adjusted over time to be
eventually repealed in 2015.
In Hong Zhang’s article (2007), From Resisting to Embracing? the One-Child Rule:
Understanding New Fertility Trends in a Central China Village, the development of family
planning policies is divided into four phases: the moderate period from 1970-1976, the draconian
period from 1977-1983, the adjusting period from 1984-1990, and the stabilizing and accepting
period from 1991-2000. During the moderate period, households most commonly had two to
8

three children (Zhang, 2007, p. 863). It was during this period that the policy of “later, longer,
and fewer” was emphasized through various campaigns. “Later” referred to the Chinese
Communist Party’s requirements for later marriages, the woman having to be 23 and the man to
be 25 to be given an official marriage license and recognition. “Longer” meant that there should
be three years or more between having a first and second child, and “fewer” suggested that
couples should have no more than two kids (Zhang, 2017, p. 143). At this early stage in family
planning policies, enforcement was deemed lenient and an ideal more than a concrete law, but in
reality, it was both coercive and effective.
In the 1970s, to begin to control population growth, rather than just put out idealistic
slogans, the Chinese government implemented six different forms of intervention, particularly
aimed at rural areas. These methods of state involvement included free access to contraceptives,
abortion, and sterilization, enforcement of late marriage guidelines and incentivizing adhering to
birth limits, campaigns to promote smaller family size and birth limits, the creation of a state
family planning bureaucracy, and including population goals in the central planning process.
(White, 2003, p. 184) “Socialist planning thus came to embrace human reproduction in much the
same way that it embraced agricultural and industrial production. Local officials… now began to
receive quotas for babies.” (White, 2003, p. 185) While these initial policies were technically
voluntary, they had many coercive elements and there was a significant uptick in intrauterine
device (IUD) insertions, abortions, and sterilizations (Zhang, 2017, p. 143). In the next period of
policy development, coercion to ensure effective policy implementation became much more
common.
In the draconian period, from 1977-1983, more families began to adhere to the two-child
household norm, and households with only one child were on the rise (Zhang, 2007, p. 863). It
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was during this time that the state officially implemented the stringent one-child policy, even
though fertility rates had already declined from 5.81 children per household on average in 1970
to 2.75 in 1979 from the “later, longer, fewer” policy (Zhang, 2007, p. 860). Given the historical
importance of large family sizes in rural areas, to be able to have hands to work the fields and
children to support their parents in old age, there was significant pushback and outrage from
rural families in the early 1980s. As government policy became more aggressive, so did the
people it was affecting. The family planning policies created a fundamental value conflict with
which people were forced to reconcile; the duty to the nation, which would prioritize following
the family planning policies, and the patriarchal duty to family and ancestors, which emphasizes
having many children and having sons to guarantee one’s future (White, 2003, p. 197). Rural
families were more inclined to prioritize the protection of their family lineage before serving the
socialist collective. White (2003) characterizes this resistance into three categories:
confrontation, evasion, and accommodation.
While the cultural pressure to have big families in rural areas was the impetus for
rebellion, families were angry with local cadres and doctors that enforced the national policy and
how they did so. Women that were carrying illegal pregnancies or had reached the child limit
faced intense and coercive pressure to undergo abortions, sterilizations, and the implementation
of IUDs. Given the nature of the rural healthcare system in the post-Maoist, de-collectivized era,
sometimes these birth control procedures were botched, resulting in various issues and disputes.
Soon, these disputes all too commonly caused angry families to engage in direct and violent
confrontation for those who reported violations of the policies, performed the procedures, or
generally implemented the policies. In a county in Jiangsu province, from January of 1987 to
May of 1988, one-third of 381 reported “incidents of revenge” were related to birth planning
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(White, 2003, p. 188). However, along with a rising consciousness of an individual’s legal rights,
there was a slow uptick in rural people appealing to the law and going to court to challenge
corrupt policy implementation.
The second most common form of resistance to the stringent birth control policies was
“evasion.” Families would attempt to conceal their illegal pregnancies until it was too late, either
by timing it well to be able to physically cover it up, leaving the village during the pregnancy, or
by bribing doctors to fake monthly examinations and procedures. Additionally, some couples
would live together or marry without the legal marriage permit, as the policy was largely
enforced on legally married couples (White, 2003, p. 190). While this period witnessed the
strictest policies, it also gave way to increased inconsistencies in policy enforcement. Officials
were inclined not to disclose high numbers of illegal pregnancies and births as it reflected poorly
on them, which had a direct effect on their income and standing. Local cadres were also
sometimes sympathetic to their townspeople, particularly those with only one girl, and were
more willing to turn a blind eye to their policy violations until they had a son. This also
encouraged the practice of levying fines for illegal births rather than engaging in preventative
measures to stop the pregnancies from happening or being carried to term (White, 2003, p. 191).
This inconsistent application of the one-child policy and frequency of loopholes led to
various unforeseen consequences and a change in the law. Since the policy was met with
widespread resistance in the early 1980s in the countryside, it was changed in 1984 to allow for
more households to have two children under certain circumstances. “For rural China, then, the
one-child limit has been more of a goal than a reality.” (White, 2003, p. 187) If a rural household
had a daughter, they were allowed to have a second child in hopes of it being a son, though they
had to wait four or five years to do so. In some places, even families with one son were allowed
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to have a second child. “Given the practical difficulties, the central government relaxed the
policy to make it more feasible in rural areas.” (Zhang, 2017, p. 144) While now officially
permitting for more children, this adjusted policy resulted in stricter implementation of the birth
planning targets and harsher crackdowns on those who violated them, “strengthened by closing
up loopholes for local implementation and supervision.” (Zhang, 2007, p. 862)
Finally, the third avenue of resistance during the draconian period was “accommodation”,
which included female infanticide, female infant abandonment, and sex-selective abortions
(White, 2003, p. 193). This unintentionally, but slowly, altered attitudes towards gender roles
and family structure. Because families could only have one or two children, each child became
more important to securing the patrilineal line and providing for their parents in old age,
regardless of gender, and this was soon reflected in parent’s treatment of their daughters.
Throughout the rest of the adjusting period and into the 1990s and early 2000s, the family
planning policies continued to evolve but became more common-place and socially acceptable.
One-child households became as common as two-child households, and later, the standard, while
families became more neutral in their gender preferences for children (Zhang, 2007, p. 864).
Another reason the family planning policies were revisited and adjusted in the 1990s and
early 2000s was in part due to the 1994 International Conference on Population and
Development in Cairo, Egypt, and the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing,
China. The setup of the Chinese government and the size of the country requires that sanctioned
policies from the central government are enforced by officials at the township and village level.
Due to the resistance the policies faced, particularly in rural areas in China in the 1980s, it
became clear that this heavy-handed top-down approach was not working and signified a need
for change in the public’s perception of the policies. While the family planning policies brought
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an improvement to reproductive health in China, women did not have many choices regarding
their care. At these conferences, feminist activists helped transform “the agenda from the
achievement of demographic targets to the enhancement of women’s sexual and reproductive
health, choice, and rights.” (Greenhalgh, 2001, p. 852) It was a more patient-centered approach,
that “provides better quality care and a choice among contraceptive methods, in addition to an
expanded range of reproductive health services.” (Hardee et al., 2004, p. 75) While it gave
women a bit more freedom and a higher quality of care, the policies were still controlling fertility
rates quite strictly.
In 2012, steps towards officially repealing the one-child policy and allowing more
children to be born were taken. A think tank that works closely with the Chinese national
government proposed a three-step policy transition that would allow a national two-child policy
by 2015, and all birth limits removed by 2020 (Basten & Jiang, 2015, p. S98). In 2013, the
government announced a relaxation of the one-child policy and began its dissolution (Whyte et
al., 2015 p. 144) in favor of a two-child policy. However, since the one-child policy has been
officially repealed, the fertility rate as of 2018 is only 1.7 (World Bank, 2018), and China is now
facing another slew of problems as a consequence of the intense family planning policies.

Policy Results
While the one-child policy and other family planning policies created some new
problems in China, it was extremely effective at bringing down fertility rates and slowing the
rate of population growth to substantially grow the economy. The fertility rate is defined as the
average number of children born to women during their reproductive years. This decreased from
2.9 in 1979 to 1.7 in 2004, though the majority of that change actually took place before the one-
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child policy was implemented. Between 1970 and 1979, the fertility rate decreased from 5.9 to
2.9. As the implementation of the policies was different in urban and rural areas, it follows that
in 2004, the urban fertility rate was 1.3, and the rural fertility rate was just under 2.0. (Hesketh et
al., 2005, p.1172)
Since the one-child policy has been revealed, one study evaluating fertility trends
discovered that according to official sources, “among the estimated more than 11 million couples
who were eligible to have a second child under the new rule, only 1.69 million had applied as of
August 2015, accounting for 15.4% of such couples,” (Guo et al., 2019, p. 247). This study
examined the total fertility rate (TFR) for China based on a 2015 mini-census, as well as the TFR
for specific cohorts within China. It found that the TFR in 2015 was 1.047, an exceptionally low
fertility rate and a decrease from 2010 when the one-child policy was still in place, which sat at
1.188 (Guo et al., 2019, p. 247). Interestingly, the rural and urban TFRs are different. In 2015,
the urban TFR was 0.914 and the rural TFR was 1.265. Both values are decreases from 2010, in
which the urban TFR was 0.979 and the rural TFR was 1.444 (Guo et al., 2019, p. 248). As
enforcement of the family planning policies was stricter in urban areas, it follows that the fertility
rates would be slightly different between rural and urban communities.
Along with declined fertility rates, another figure that has changed with the family
planning policies is the sex ratio at birth, defined as the proportion of male to female births. In
industrialized countries, this ratio is typically somewhere between 1.03 and 1.07, however, since
1979 in China, this rate has slowly continued to increase. It was 1.06 in 1979, 1.11 in 1988, and
1.17 in 2001 (Hesketh et al., 2005, p.1172). Again, this ratio is different in rural and urban areas
and changes with birth order, as the policies in rural areas generally allowed more exceptions to
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the one-child policy. Overall, however, the sex ratio increases with each successive birth,
indicating a sustained preference for having sons in Chinese culture.
Even though each child had become more important to the family, most women still feel
pressure from their older family members and society-at-large to have sons. A 45-year-old
woman explained this by saying, “Our generation treats girls and boys equal. But there is a
common sentence in the village: boys are treasure, girls are trouble.” (Hardee et al., 2004, p. 72)
The numbers reflect this sentiment.
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Chapter 3: Family Planning and Women’s Changing Attitudes
From the start, the Chinese government intended the one-child policy and other family
planning policies to be temporary to create a small-family culture. This goal was certainly
achieved. Within a few decades, the culture had fundamentally shifted away from feudalistic and
agrarian obligations of having large families to a culture in which most women voluntarily prefer
small families. This can be attributed to a few different influences, but in large part is due to the
impact of the policy itself on changing women’s attitudes and status, as well as how the policy
was implemented and enforced.
These attitude changes include women’s perspective of the effects of the family planning
policies on their lives, in terms of whether they felt it had an overall positive or negative effect.
At first, women did not believe the policies had an overall positive effect, as the implementation
was forced and coercive. However, over time as the policies changed and the more long-term
positive effects became visible, women’s attitudes began to change. Additionally, women’s
attitudes towards having children changed. In the early 1970s, women were accustomed to
having an average of six children and resistant to having a small family. Over the thirty years of
policy development and implementation, this changed, and women voluntarily preferred having
a small family over a large one. These changes also involved women’s attitudes surrounding the
use of different types of contraceptives. Abortions became more normalized over time, and IUD
implementation is the favored choice of contraception for many women in China today. Finally,
women’s attitudes regarding the sex preference of their children also changed with the family
planning policies (Hardee et al., 2004, p. 72), as daughters became more valuable to society-atlarge and their families. This challenged the traditional Chinese belief of men being more
valuable than women.
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In terms of women’s liberation from an inferior status to men, the one-child policy
showed women the opportunities they could have without the burden of multiple children by
having access to contraceptives, something that had not been accessible in China before. While
women supported the policy officially and enjoyed the benefits it allowed them both inside and
outside of the home, the enforcement and implementation of the policies gave women hesitation,
but this also contributed to altering their attitudes and societal status. Their status was certainly
elevated in comparison to China before the 1970s, however, the policy’s focus was not first and
foremost in the interest of women’s health and choices. As enforcement began in a coercive and
aggressive manner, women were often uncomfortable with the forms of birth control and the
invasion of privacy in their health by local officials. But as the policies changed and women
began to see the positive effects of contraceptives and other manners of birth control on their
lives, these hesitations started to fade. Within thirty years of the family planning policies being
implemented, Chinese culture and society have fundamentally changed, in that it now prefers the
small-family model and has removed itself from the patriarchal past as women now have roles
outside of the home and are more valued members of society.

Women’s Liberation
In the 1970s, when the “later, longer, fewer” policies were put in place, the government
justified these policies as helping to improve women’s health and to liberate them. Getting
married later, by waiting longer between having children, and having fewer children would allow
women more opportunities outside the home, in work, and education. It would also be better for
not only the women’s health but their children’s health as well. In turn, this liberation of women
thanks to the state, would increase women’s status in society and give them a larger role in
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contributing to national development. The party was deemed the savior and hero of women who
had been oppressed by the traditional family in China. In this way, “Women's liberation was
inextricably linked to national liberation: in emancipating women, the party was also liberating
the nation from a semicolonial, semifeudal past, transforming it into a modern, powerful nation
able to reclaim its rightful place in the world.” (Greenhalgh, 2001, p. 853)
However, in 1979, with the nation’s impending economic crisis and the decision to
reform the Chinese market, the state birth planning policies took on a different function. They no
longer prioritized liberating and serving women, but instead began to use women as a means to
achieve an end goal that would benefit the entire nation and future generations. “During the
1980s and early 1990s the women's health and liberation narrative remained the official line, but,
in fact, women's interests were radically subordinated to those of the nation.” (Greenhalgh, 2001,
p. 854) Despite this change, the effect of the policy was the same – it brought about the smallfamily culture and gave women the possibility of playing a different role in the family. This led
to many women supporting the policies, even though the focus was not necessarily intended to
liberate women.
In 1996 and 1998, some researchers surveyed women, ages 20-55, in Jiangsu, Anhui, and
Yunnan about what effects the family planning policies had on their health, education, job
opportunities, income, leisure time, and their household work. Overwhelmingly, the majority of
women felt that these family planning policies had overall positive effects on these aspects of
their lives. However, there were slight variations between rural and urban provinces. The most
positively rated benefits were better health, less household work, more income, and more job
opportunities. In Jiangsu, over 96% of women said these were benefits of family planning, for
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Anhui and Yunnan, nearly 80% or more of women perceived these things as benefits. (Hardee et
al., 2004, p. 73)
This survey also highlighted the generational differences among women towards state
birth planning policies. The older generation of women did not have access to contraceptives or
family planning during their child-bearing years and often had many kids. One 60-year-old
woman who had five children said, “Now young people are so happy—they have family
planning. At that time, we didn’t want to make more children but we had no family planning
methods.” (Hardee et al., 2004, p. 71) This sentiment was reflected by other women of the older
generation, who wished they would have had access to family planning resources and more
options outside of the home. Another woman interviewed, a 70-year-old mother to five, said that
after having three children, her capability to work and to socialize was severely limited because
she had to take care of her children. She said, “If family planning had been available earlier, my
life would have been different. That is my lifelong regret. Because I had too many children, I had
to quit.” (Hardee et al., 2004, p. 73) One woman interviewed in Carma Hinton’s documentary
(1984), “Small Happiness: Women of a Chinese Village”, said she supported birth control and
having fewer children. This woman said that when her children do not listen to her and do not
help with the farm or house, she tells them “Too bad birth control came too late for you!” (19:1820:00)
The middle generation of women, on whom the one-child policy was enforced, had a
unique perspective to offer. In general, these women tended to support the policies as they saw
the positive effects it could and did have on their job opportunities, household burden, and
income. However, many women were also hesitant at first to be told how many children they
were allowed to have, even though they were open to having fewer children. The one-child
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policy allowed these women a chance to play a new role in the Chinese economy and have more
autonomy over what they did with their time. Multiple women indicated that due to the family
planning policies, more women began working outside of the home, and in turn, their social
status was elevated. This began to change the culture: “Rather than wanting more children,
women said people now place a priority on how they can make money to provide better housing
and education for their children.” (Hardee et al., 2004, p. 73) While many women saw the
positive benefits of the family planning policies, they also had concerns about how the policy
was implemented and enforced, particularly those with irreversible consequences, such as
mandatory sterilization.
The youngest generation, the women who had been born under the one-child policy and
were around the child-bearing age at the time of the interviews, showed the result of the
changing culture around family size over time. These women noted that their mothers and
mothers-in-law would share information about reproductive health with them, largely
emphasizing that having more children means a larger burden on the family, and that, “If you
have more children, you will become a baby-making machine and will get old very quickly.”
(Hardee et al., 2004, p. 71)
Women understood the health risk that having many children could pose, and after a few
decades of access to contraceptives and policies limiting the number of children women could
have, they had begun to teach their daughters about the small-family mindset that was imprinted
upon them. This young generation of women indicated they were content with only having one
or two children, and that they did not want more than that. Some survey research has shown a
direct correlation between age and support for China’s family planning policies; in a survey
conducted in 2005, 85.42% of women ages 20-29 supported the policies, 80.11% of women 30-
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39 support them, 79.71% of women ages 40-49 supported them, 74.31% of women ages 50-59
supported them, and only 67.86% of women above the age of 60 supported the policies (Cao et
al., 2009, p. 368). The impact of these policies over time on women’s attitudes towards having
children is evident.

Impact of Policy Enforcement on Changing Attitudes
The enforcement of the family planning policies beginning in the 1970s was inconsistent,
often coercive, and did not prioritize women’s health and choices, but instead prioritized
preventing a national crisis from occurring. Because of how the policy was being enforced, some
women were slow to accept the small-family mindset and support the policies. While the family
planning campaign of “later, longer, fewer” in the 1970s was technically voluntary, it was
enforced at the local level by grassroots birth planning workers. Those in charge of enforcement
took their job very seriously, which led to large-scale coercion. “These birth planning enforcers
kept detailed records on each woman of child-bearing age under their responsibility, including
past births, contraceptive usage and even menstrual cycles, in many reported instances becoming
“menstrual monitors” who tried to detect out-of-quota pregnancies at an early stage.” (Whyte et
al., 2015, p. 150) They became involved in every aspect of women’s fertility and family
planning.
If a woman became pregnant when she was not supposed to, local officials would harass
her and her family to have an abortion, and after a woman had a third child, particularly women
in rural areas, she would be pressured to have an intrauterine device (IUD) inserted or to undergo
sterilization. Other ways in which families were pressured into following the guidelines were
threats that if they had a child out of turn, that child would be denied household registration,
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which excludes them from a myriad of other societal benefits, such as education and ration
coupons (Whyte et al., 2015, p. 150). The numbers reflect this trend. In 1971, there were 6.17
million IUD insertions, 1.74 million female sterilization operations, and 3.91 million induced
abortions. In 1979, there were 30.58 million birth control operations, 5.29 million female
sterilization, and 7.86 million induced abortions (Whyte et al, 2015, p. 151). Given such a large
increase in these numbers, combined with the various forms of resistance to the policies
discussed earlier, it stands to reason that this was not voluntary family planning, but rather quite
coercive, particularly before the implementation of the one-child policy.
While enforcement could be coercive, as mentioned before, having access to
contraceptives was a new phenomenon in China for most women, and many of them were open
to the idea of having fewer children. But, the methods of contraception, primarily IUDs and
sterilization, gave many women pause. Even with IUDs, there was a possibility of contraceptive
failure, in which a woman would end up having to undergo an abortion, hide their pregnancy, or
have an illegal birth. In Jiangsu, 29% of 1,500 women interviewed had a pregnancy as a result of
contraceptive failure, 12% of 1,496 women in Anhui did, and 9% of 1,505 women in Yunnan
experienced this as well (Hardee, 2004, p. 71). Though the chances of contraceptive failure were
relatively low, it was still a concern for some women. Sterilization, a much more drastic
procedure as it is irreversible, was more controversial. One woman cited concerns about having a
child that might later show developmental disabilities in which he could not walk or talk, and if
the woman had been sterilized already after two births, she would not be able to have another
child. Another woman expressed concerns about the marriage ending in divorce, and if the
woman wants to remarry later, she will not be able to have children after being sterilized
(Hardee, 2004, p. 71).
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Women’s attitudes towards contraceptive use were cautious at first, especially given the
coercive and forced utilization that often required a surgical procedure and potentially
irreversible results in the case of sterilization. Many of these women underwent physical and
psychological distress, including the women that were in charge of enforcing the policies at the
grassroots level in the 1970s. Their personal reproductive health was no longer personal, but
privy to the government. Local women in charge of enforcing the policies were sometimes
attacked and ridiculed by families on which they were enforcing the policies. They also had to
follow the policies themselves, while simultaneously being in charge of mandating the birth
programs on local women and their families. It was not an easy adjustment and was met with
resistance and hesitation, at first, but as women began to see the results of contraceptive use and
how the small family changed their lives, attitudes towards contraceptive use began to change.

Cultural Changes
The creation and implementation of family planning policies and programs led to a
fundamental shift in Chinese culture, driven by women’s changing attitudes towards family
planning and their changing role in society. From the start, a stated goal of the policies was to
create a voluntary small-family culture, but through enforcement, the policies were far from
voluntary. Despite this, over a few decades with the aging of younger generations who were born
under these policies, the culture did shift to a voluntary small-family mindset. Women were more
inclined to prefer having only one or two children, as it allowed them to pursue opportunities
outside of the home, and cyclically, the more educated and the higher income women earned, the
stronger the support for the policies and the fewer women wanted to have multiple children.
Additionally, women were less willing to bear the large financial burden of multiple children.
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Before these intense reproductive policies were passed, the fertility rate in China was
nearly 6, meaning that on average, women were giving birth six times in their life. Women had
many children for multiple reasons, the most obvious being they did not have access to
contraceptives or family planning assistance programs. However, it was more than simply not
having the means to control fertility. China, a country with one of the oldest and richest histories,
has a long cultural tradition of filial piety, a Confucian value of obeying, respecting, and caring
for one’s elders, and passing on the family line through sons. Historically, when couples were
married in China, the bride would leave her family to become part of the husband’s family,
moving to their home and taking care of his parents. “That’s what a wife is for, open the door
and establish descendants… the more children, the more prosperity. You give birth to as many as
your fate has in store.” (Hinton, 1985, 18:54-19:13) Males, however, were the guarantee to
passing on the family line and having security in old age. When men married, for the most part,
they did not leave the home and the eldest son was responsible for caring for his parents in old
age. This cultural norm is reflected in the language.
In written Chinese, the character that means “to marry a woman” is 娶 (Qǔ). When
broken down into its components, the top half of the character is 取 (Qǔ), which means “to take,”
and the bottom half of the character is 女 (Nǚ), which means “woman.” To marry a woman is to
take a woman. On the other hand, the word that means “to marry a man” is 嫁 (Jià). When this is
broken down, the radical component is 女 (Nǚ), which means “woman,” and the right side of the
character is 家 (Jiā), which means “home” or “family.” The makeup of this character reflects the
idea in traditional China of the woman leaving her home and joining another family and
household when she marries a man. Today, a more neutral term for getting married is used often.
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Families would have a lot of children to ensure they had sons to carry on the family line.
There was also the fear that if they had only one son, something might happen which causes him
to be unable to care for the family adequately, so they wanted to have multiple sons to ensure
their future. Another reason why families were large is that, until recently, China has been
primarily an agrarian and rural society. Families needed more bodies and hands to work in the
fields to sustain their crops. This was a longstanding traditional belief in Chinese culture that was
not going to be driven out easily, hence the severity of the policies and repercussions for
violating them.
However, by 2004, after a little over 30 years of the family planning policies being in
place, the average fertility rate had fallen to just 1.7 (Hesketh et al., 2005, p. 1172) and it has
remained at 1.6 or 1.7 since (World Bank, 2018). Even as policies began to be relaxed in the
2000s and eventually repealed, fertility rates have remained low and pose a challenge to China’s
future. Today, it is largely by preference and voluntary for women to want fewer children.
Particularly the younger generation of women feel that they have been liberated from the hold of
traditional, feudal China in which they had to remain in the home, essentially as baby-making
machines. While the enforcement of the policies was largely not in the best interests of women
and their rights and liberation, but primarily focused on the nation’s best interests, this was still a
result of the changes in family size and structure. A very traditional way of thinking, referred to
in Mandarin as “男主外女主内”, meaning “men go out to work and women stay at home” was
being challenged and changed over time. Women had better access to higher education than
before and had more opportunities in the job market that gave them a higher socioeconomic
status (Chen et al., 2010, p. 40).

25

The role that men played in the families created a culture in which sons were preferred to
daughters. During the implementation of the one-child policy, this cultural belief was
exacerbated in many ways. Due to the new technology of ultrasounds and the introduction and
normalization of abortions in China, even though it was illegal, sex-selective abortions were
common because of the societal pressure of having a son. When the female child was not
aborted, female infant abandonment and infanticide were also common practices (White, 2003,
p. 193). Today, the sex preference of children has changed, but some bias in favor of having sons
still exists. “Although infanticide of girls is probably very rare now, less aggressive treatment of
sick female infants is known to occur.” (Hesketh et al., 2005, p. 1173) Though younger
generations were more supportive of the one-child policy and having smaller families,
“regardless of which generation they are a part of, women have all felt pressure to have sons.”
(Hardee et al., 2003, p. 74)
While in some cases the preference of having male children was exacerbated, in other
ways, attitudes began to change towards the value of daughters that challenged this traditional
belief. Families were having fewer children, so each child’s worth to providing for the family
was increasing. Additionally, because of the market reforms, young women were able to find
employment in urban areas and provide for their parents. Daughters tended to be more diligent
and consistent at sending money back home to their families (Zhang, 2007, p. 867-68), which
contributed to dispensing of the idea that only sons could take care of their family. Furthermore,
parents were expected to raise quality citizens who could participate in advancing China’s
economy (Zhang, 2007, p. 869), encouraging parents to invest in the education and development
of their children, regardless of gender. If parents failed to provide well enough for their children,
they lost face and were considered to be bad parents (Zhang, 2007, p. 857), further motivating
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them to care equally for their sons and daughters. Additionally, because of the imbalanced sex
ratio at birth as a result of the slow-to-change preference of having sons, there are now fewer
women. This inherently elevated the status of daughters in the family and women in society,
dispensing with the idea that daughters were only a small happiness to their families.
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Chapter 4: Other Factors in Women’s Changing Attitudes
“No matter if it is a white cat or a black cat; as long as it can catch mice, it is a good cat.”
Deng Xiaoping infamously stated this regarding China’s market reforms, indicating a shift from
China’s primary focus on political ideology to economic growth. This way of thinking led the
Chinese to embrace various market reforms that utilized some characteristics of capitalism to
rapidly grow the economy and catch up with the West. These policies were implemented
alongside the state birth planning policies and programs, both of which intended to save China
from the drain of overpopulation on the country’s resources.
While the family planning programs impacted women’s lives on a largely documented
scale, these economic changes also impacted the lives of women, and in many ways, gave them
more options and better access to the labor market, education, and empowerment opportunities.
Had the family planning policies not been accompanied by this market reform in China,
women’s attitudes towards childbearing would not have changed so drastically. The prevalence
of contraceptives and the state’s involvement in planning births showed women what their lives
within the household could look like with fewer children, but their role outside the home still
would not have changed significantly if their access to these opportunities did not increase. The
economic reforms allowed for this fundamental shift in gender roles, thus contributing to
women’s changing attitudes towards family planning and childbearing. However, as there is a
massive rural-urban divide in China, both the family planning policies and the market reform
policies were implemented in different ways in different areas of the country. Thus, rural women
and urban women had different changes in their attitudes towards family planning, as well as
rural-urban migrant women who then returned to their rural communities and impacted other
women’s views.
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Urban-Rural Attitude Discrepancies
In rural areas, the family planning policies, in general, were less stringent in enforcement
than those in urban areas with higher and denser populations. Rural families were often granted
exceptions and allowed to have another child under certain circumstances, sometimes
enforcement was relaxed and instead of preventing illicit births, local enforcers allowed them to
happen and simply fined families for violating them or excluded their children from accessing
resources. This contributed to impacting women’s attitudes towards the small-family culture
because there were more exceptions and historically, rural families were larger than urban ones.
The fertility rate is certainly influenced by more than just official reproductive policies and
women’s individual choices. Women’s education opportunities, labor market opportunities,
empowerment, access to contraceptives and family planning programs, and many other factors
influence fertility rates (Cao et al., 2009, p. 360). This is a common trend seen in western
countries. With the elevation of women’s status and opportunities, fertility rates and the desire
for children decreases. In urban areas, the enforcement of family planning policies was strict, as
these areas were highly populated and contributed to the drain on resources the most. Exceptions
were not as common and enforcement was more standardized, as the government’s presence in
urban areas and large cities is relatively strong.
In urban areas, women generally had better access to higher education and job
opportunities, which led them to have higher education than rural women and higher-income
jobs than rural women. This directly impacted their desire to have children and their support for
the family planning policies. There is a strong positive correlation between education
achievement levels and support for China’s family planning policy. Nearly 65% of women with
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lower education supported the policy, 81.59% of women with a high school degree supported the
policy, 87.68% with a bachelor’s degree supported it, 93.59% of women with a master’s degree
support it, and 96.15% of women with a Ph.D. support the policy (Cao et al., 2009, p. 370). This
could be a function of a few different influences. Women with higher education generally have
“higher socioeconomic status and greater exposure to the influence of modern values than
women with less education receive.” (Chen et al., 2010, p. 40) Women with higher education in
China also could understand the government’s rationale better behind implementing the family
planning policies, leading them to support it more actively.
The type of work in rural and urban areas is also quite different. Some common jobs for
women from rural areas tend to be farmers, migrant laborers, factory workers, or be unemployed,
whereas women from urban areas tend to work as government employees, business managers,
teachers, other professional jobs, or as students (Cao et al., 2009). There is a correlation between
the type of employment and support for the government’s family planning policies and attitudes
towards childbearing. “The number of children that women were willing to bear was lowest for
students, business managers, teachers, and government employees and highest for unemployed
women and farm women.” (Cao et al., 2009, p. 362) Additionally, in a survey completed in
2001, 57% of women indicated they would prefer to have two children, while 35% said they
prefer only one child. Among these women, only 1.9% of women in urban areas wanted more
than two children, while 5.8% of women overall wanted more than two children (Ding &
Hesketh, 2006, p. 372).
These differences between rural and urban women are highlighted by the experience of
rural-urban migrant women as they return to their rural homes. Women who returned to their
homes after migrating to urban tended to bring urban ideas back with them, including better
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knowledge of contraceptive use, female empowerment in terms of making decisions about
marriage and family planning, and more. “Return migrant women who had been living in a large
city were 37 percent more likely than rural nonmigrant women to desire a one-child family
without son preference.” (Chen et al., 2010, p. 38) When they returned, nonmigrant women in
rural areas would interact with them and be influenced by their ideas and perspectives. In this
way, return migrant women acted as informal purveyors of China’s family planning policies and
assisted in changing the culture to a small-family mindset.

Women’s Growing Value to Society
Another result of the changing economic situation in China was greater awareness of the
burdens that more children would bring families and particularly women, even if the government
relaxed policies and encouraged larger families. Women cited concern about greater economic
burden as the primary reason for not choosing to have more children even if the government
allowed it, and the second most cited concern was difficulty in finding employment for the
children (Cao et al., 2009, p. 369).
Hong Zhang (2007) argues in his article that there are “four emerging socio-economic
and demographic factors that help facilitate new fertility trends and behavior,” (p. 864) namely
new attitudes about child-rearing as the primary means of securing old-age support and methods
of coping, the changing meaning of filial piety or paying respect to one’s elders, new standards
of what it is to be a good parent, and an evolved understanding of the link between fertility
behavior and poverty.
As families were having fewer children in accordance with government policy, each child
became inherently more important and economically valuable to the family. Since families had
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fewer chances at having a son due to strict birth control policies, many became reliant on their
daughters as well. Given the economic changes and the new opportunities for women in China,
daughters became increasingly more valuable to parents as they could now feasibly provide for
their parents in old age. “Young women were more likely to find urban employment than their
male counterparts” (Zhang, 2007, p. 867) and they “were often more generous and more
consistent in sending money home” (p. 868) than sons were. In addition to the economic
advantage seen in having girls, there were campaigns to promote having girls. One billboard in
Hebei province reads, “生男生女都一样，女儿也是转后人,” meaning “There’s no difference
between having a girl or a boy – girls can also continue the family line.” (Hesketh et al., 2005, p.
1173) Given these factors, the traditional Chinese belief of a son being a big happiness and a
daughter being a small happiness (Hinton, 1984) was being challenged. In the wake of the onechild policy, though seemingly counterintuitive with the occurrence of female infanticide and
sex-selective abortions, a daughter’s status in the family was elevated.
In Chinese culture, children are expected to care for and support their parents in old age.
But as times have changed, so has this expectation. With the reform and opening-up policies and
the mass industrialization of China, rural-to-urban migration increased at exponential rates. Most
of the rural youth fled the countryside seeking work in urban areas, some of whom never plan on
returning. The central government began to focus on enhancing “the quality of China’s people
for participation in a modern globalized economy,” (Zhang, 2007, p. 869) relying on the parent’s
aspirations for their children to live a better life than they did. Naturally, parents began to do all
that they were capable of to provide a better life for their children and ensure they were highquality citizens that could contribute meaningfully to China’s growing economy. This was
reflected in the greater emphasis on education for rural Chinese children, regardless of gender as
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their children were equally valuable. Hence, parents became more inclined to invest in their
child, rather than in having many children (Zhang, 2017, p. 152).
This mindset was in large part a cause of the continued low fertility rates in China
because families wanted to concentrate their resources to give their child the best chance at
success. If they had multiple children, these resources were stretched thin and neither child was
given the best education. Parents were now under the societal expectation that they provide all of
their children with a good and quality education, and if they could not afford to do so, they were
viewed as bad parents (Zhang, 2007, p. 871). The fear of this backlash led more families to
willingly have only one child, even if it were a girl and even if they had been allocated an
exception to have a second child. In one county between 1992 and 2001, “at least 22,484
qualified couples decided not to apply for a “second-birth permission certificate” and gave up
their chance for a second birth voluntarily.” (Zhang, 2007, p. 857) With younger generations of
women, the preference for sons was becoming an antiquated idea. “37% of women
(predominantly young urban women) claimed to have no preference for one sex over the other,”
(Hesketh et al., 2005, p. 1173) which was a significant increase from the past.
As children moved to urban areas to work and marriages between longer distances
became more common practice, generations of families began to live separately, and
expectations regarding filial obligation changed. “Liangbian Dianli” marriages became more
commonplace as a direct result of the one-child policy, which allowed for the bride and groom to
remain filial to and financially responsible for both sets of parents (Zhang, 2005, p. 69). Raising
children was no longer understood as the best guarantee to good living in old age because there
were fewer children and increased independence, and in its wake, elderly parents became more
self-reliant and self-sufficient. Since having fewer children helped relieve the financial burden,
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as they often migrated to urban areas, parents dealt with empty nests earlier on, giving them time
to work and invest in their own future. While parents were more aware of this change and
capable of adjusting to it, they still hoped that they had raised filial children who would support
them in old age. Often, given they provided well for their child, they would indeed be paid back
(Zhang, 2005, p. 75). This issue of having fewer children to care for their parents and
grandparents has become known as the 4:2:1 phenomenon, meaning that “increasing numbers of
couples will be solely responsible for the care of one child and four parents.” (Hesketh et al.,
2005, p. 1174) While there is concern about this filial duty not being fulfilled, the idea of “saving
face” is an especially important cultural aspect in China, in which people will try to create a
positive public image of themselves and their families and would not risk doing something to
destroy that. Not taking care of your elder family members would be “losing face” in the public
eye, and this is inherently an incentive for children to take care of their family members in old
age.
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Chapter 5: Analysis and Evaluation
The family planning policies of the 1970s began a large change in China’s society,
demography, and culture. While in urban areas, as early as the 1930s families were already
becoming smaller and women had more career opportunities than rural women, the family
planning policies exacerbated the decline in fertility rates and the economic reforms accelerated
women’s liberation, particularly in rural areas which tend to change more slowly than urban
areas. At first, these policies resulted in families in both urban and rural settings involuntarily
becoming very small. However, over three decades, alongside the economic reforms, women’s
attitudes towards family size and their role in society changed quite quickly, and they began to
voluntarily have fewer children.
The fertility rates in urban areas are on average lower than that in rural areas, in part due
to the stricter policy enforcement but also in part due to the natural desire for smaller families
that comes in urban places. With limited space, more career opportunities, higher expenses, and
less of a practical need for many children, as is often the case in rural areas, urbanites tend to
desire fewer children as is. However, in urban and rural China, fertility rates have stayed
extremely low, and this is due to women’s attitude changes in which they voluntarily prefer
small families. As evidenced by the research presented in this paper, women are desiring fewer
children for a myriad of reasons.
In the 1970s, when birth policies were first established, their coercive implementation
forced women to have fewer children, which over time allowed them to see the different kind of
life they could have without being tethered to the home and raising children. The stringent onechild policy at first exacerbated the traditional Chinese preference for sons, leading to an
increase in female infant abandonment, female infanticide, sex-selective abortions, or general
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neglect of female children. Over time, however, this indirectly elevated women’s societal status
as they became more valuable to the family, as well as society-at-large due to the shortage of
women as the sex ratio has become unbalanced.
As the market and educational opportunities opened up to women with the economic
reform of the 1980s, women’s roles in the family continued to change and they became even
more valuable. With these new opportunities outside of the home in the labor market and
education, women began to desire fewer children and to marry later (Yu, 2015), leading to a
consistent low fertility rate. The family planning policies and China’s market reform changed
women’s attitudes towards childbearing, family size, and sex preference of their children,
therefore accelerating the shift from China’s once patriarchal and feudal culture to a more equal
culture that values women more, resulting in continued low fertility rates despite the relaxation
of family planning policies.
Due to this unexpected long-lasting attitude change, in which women are desiring fewer
children, China faces a myriad of issues moving forward. Simply relaxing the family planning
policies is not doing enough to bring fertility rates back up to a sustainable level to address
China’s aging population and the 4:2:1 issue. Fertility rates have continued to stay low despite
families being permitted to have more children and interviewed women said they would not be
inclined to have more children even if the government encouraged them to do so, because “they
could not afford the cost of supporting and educating additional children.” (Cao et al., 2009, p.
364) Other cited reasons for not wanting to have more children were concerns about both the
mother and the child’s employment opportunities, as well as simply not wanting to go through
childbirth or risk their health again.
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The family planning policies were only intended to create a short-term voluntary smallfamily culture in order to balance population and economic growth at a sustainable level.
However, the long-term effects on women’s attitudes towards family and fertility rates were
unexpected. The policies were focused on the short-term with an impending fear of economic
collapse. Between the first policy of “later, longer, fewer” and the implementation of the onechild policy, fertility rates experienced the most drastic change to date, dropping from 5.81 to
2.75 (Zhang, 2007, p. 860). This change occurred in less than a decade, but China still chose to
create the stringent one-child policy in 1979, indicating that they had not yet achieved their goal
of a voluntary small-family culture, or that the growing population was still deemed a threat to
economic growth. However, fertility rates did not drop to below 2 until 14 years later, sitting at
1.8 in 1993 (World Bank, 2018). When the policy was relaxed in 2013 and then repealed in
2015, fertility rates remained at the same low level.
I believe these rates and the government’s actions demonstrate the change in family
culture from being involuntarily small to voluntarily small. Between 1970 and 1979,
enforcement had been coercive and harsh, resulting in various forms of resistance on a large
scale. The first policies succeeded in lowering fertility rates, but not at creating a voluntary
small-family culture. The one-child policy certainly was not any more voluntary than the policies
of the early 1970s, yet over the next few decades, a voluntary small-family culture emerged in
both rural and urban areas – an impressive feat, though not a short-term change because the
economic reforms also contributed to changing women’s attitudes.
To address the issues arising from the exceedingly low fertility rates, there are several
avenues of change the Chinese government could pursue. While China is currently operating
under relaxed family planning policies, if the government were to completely repeal these

37

policies, fertility rates would likely continue to remain low because women’s attitudes towards
childbearing and their role in the family, as well as family culture in both rural and urban areas,
has changed significantly. If the Chinese government wants to increase fertility rates to address
their aging population and other socioeconomic problems, it is going to have a difficult time
doing so without incentivizing families or considering the long-term effects of policies and
campaigns. Though, the Chinese government historically has tended to solely focus on the shortterm.
A good starting point to increasing fertility rates would be to survey women as to why
they do not want to have more children and work from there in creating policy. For example,
women were primarily concerned about being able to afford the cost of not just having children,
but adequately funding the education of each child. The government could begin to address the
additional costs and the competitiveness of education in China to curtail this concern. Another
reason why women were hesitant to have more children was the mother losing her employment.
The government could begin implementing social safety nets or protections for women in the
workforce that would address these barriers preventing them from having more children. While
an unorthodox approach to creating policy in China, it could prove to be extremely useful and
effective in increasing fertility rates to a stable level. Women also cited the experience and health
concerns of childbirth as a reason against having more children, the government could also begin
here by examining the healthcare system in regard to childbirth. While these policy changes
would potentially increase fertility rates, they do not address the other existing issues as a result
of continued low fertility.
It is difficult to conjecture what policy China will choose to pursue. The Chinese
government tends to use a top-down approach in creating policy with heavy-handed
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enforcement. If China were to completely abolish all family-planning policies, it would likely do
so under the guise of success. However, I do not expect that they will fully abolish all familyplanning laws as the state may not be ready to release control over birth planning. The
government may choose to launch a pro-fertility campaign operating under existing or slightly
loosed policies, encouraging families to have more children using nationalist slogans, as their
political history would suggest. Nonetheless, economic development also contributed
significantly to lowering fertility rates, and the government is not likely to try to reverse these
changes, but simply changing family planning policies will not adequately address fertility.
I think the most important lesson here for China to learn is to consider the larger picture
and the long-term when enacting policy. Politically, Chinese history relies on short-term
campaigns, participation on a mass scale, and fervent acceptance and support of the policies from
the Chinese people. Often, the government has not acknowledged mistaken policies or
wrongdoings, such as the Great Leap Forward Famine, suggesting the government likely will not
admit fault with these policies. The family planning policies were considered to be an emergency
measure, but in tandem with socioeconomic changes, have resulted in unforeseen consequences
that will need to be addressed.
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Conclusion
Starting in the 1970s, China embarked on one of the most ambitious family planning
programs in the world, primarily to address population concerns. What began as moderate
policies and political slogans soon developed into intense, strict, coercive policies that did not
prioritize the well-being and interests of women but used them as objects to save the country
from economic ruin. These policies changed over the 1980s and 1990s, and the stringent onechild policy was eventually repealed in 2015. These policies were intended to create a voluntary
small-family culture and slow down population growth, and they were incredibly successful at
accomplishing this objective. However, even though the policies have been relaxed, fertility rates
remain low, which are causing new issues. The family planning policies not only succeeded in
slowing population growth but also accelerated the changing traditional cultural beliefs about the
family and the role of women in society.
In the past, Chinese families were large and emphasized the role of sons as the primary
caretakers of the family and the best way to preserve the family line. However, due to the impact
of the family planning policies, the implementation of these policies, and the concurrent market
reforms, the cultural viewpoints and family expectations changed dramatically. Women were
open to having fewer children, but the enforcement of the policies was drastic and resisted at
first. Over time as women began to see the way their lives changed with fewer children; they felt
liberated from the oppressive nature of the traditional family in China. The government intended
to use the family planning policies to increase women’s status in society, but in 1979, they
largely abandoned that goal in favor of saving the nation by controlling women’s bodies
(Greenhalgh, 2001, p. 854).
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Despite the government shifting its focus to the economic crisis, women were liberated.
They gained better access to education, the labor market, and were more empowered than they
had ever been in the past. Women’s status increased as they were playing a large part in the
market and the nation’s development, but also because the value of daughters increased. China
slowly began to move away from the traditional preference for sons over daughters. Children, no
matter their gender, became more important in securing the future for the family. Families
wanted to provide the best education possible for their children, including the girls, to raise
quality citizens that could contribute meaningfully to their country.
China’s family planning policies, initially imposed to limit population growth, have
established a new culture that has upended centuries-held familial beliefs and traditions. This
new culture prefers small families and is beginning to value daughters as equally as sons. It has
also liberated women from the feudalistic past, raising women’s status in society.

Challenges Moving Forward
China’s family planning policies in conjunction with the opening up and reform of the
market have led to significant changes in cultural beliefs, the demographic makeup of China, and
the economy. While the policies adequately solved China’s overpopulation issue, they have
created various new challenges that will need to be addressed in the future to maintain a strong
and healthy China. The family planning policies in China succeeded at slowing down population
growth and creating a small-family mindset. However, as a result of the low fertility rates and the
imbalanced sex ratio, China has new problems that the country will have to address moving
forward. These issues include “leftover men”, a rapidly aging population, the 4:2:1 problem, and
women’s resistance to increasing fertility rates.
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One of the most pressing issues is the imbalanced sex ratio. The sex ratio in 2001 was 1.17
(Hesketh et al., 2005, p.1172), which means today, there are approximately 34 million more men
than women in China (Ng & Tan, 2018). These men are referred to as “leftover men” and the
imbalance is said to be caused by the “lost girls” who were aborted, abandoned, or killed as an
infant under the influence of the one-child policy. This is disrupting the social balance,
particularly when it comes to marriage. While the culture in China has become slightly more
progressive than in the past in terms of women’s liberation and status relative to men, there is
still immense pressure on young people to marry. “The shortage of women may have increased
mental health problems and socially disruptive behavior among men and has left some men
unable to marry and have a family.” (Hesketh, 2008, p. 1173) Additionally, because of the
scarcity of women, there have been kidnappings and trafficking of women for men to take as
their wives, as well as more sex workers, which creates the possibility of a rise in sexually
transmitted diseases (Hesketh, 2008, p. 1173).
If fertility rates continue to stay low, as they have in other East Asian countries such as
Japan, people ages 65 and older will vastly outnumber those between 20 and 34. This creates a
plethora of issues that will have to be addressed by the government and policymakers in China.
The labor force will be significantly smaller and unable to continue China’s impressive
economic growth. This relates to the 4:2:1 issue mentioned earlier, of more couples having to
care for both sets of parents and one child because there would be a large dependency on the
state to step in and provide care for the elderly population (Basten & Jiang, 2015, p. S97). Older
generations in China throughout their lives have been reliant on the government to provide
security for them. However, with the change in demographics and the government’s new
priorities, the aging population is at risk of being forgotten.
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It seems very possible that fertility rates will continue to stay low, even if the government
were to encourage women to have more children. Some 51% of women surveyed indicated they
would not have more children, even if the government encouraged it, because “they could not
afford the cost of supporting and educating additional children.” (Cao et al., 2009, p. 364) Nearly
22% of women said they would not have more children because they were concerned about their
own and their child’s employment opportunities, and 13.8% of women simply were not willing
to go through childbirth again and risk their health (Cao et al., 2009, p. 365). Other than these
reasons, women are more liberated than they ever have been in China and are enjoying this
newfound freedom from the patriarchal and oppressive culture they have faced in the past. They
simply do not want more children, and this is a result of the family planning policies that created
a small-family culture.
While the Chinese government was focused on the short-term threat of a population
bomb that would severely hinder the country’s economic prosperity, it did not fully consider the
long-term consequences of the family planning policies and the deep effects it would have on
culture. To increase fertility rates to address these issues, Chinese policymakers need to find a
way to incentivize women to have more children. According to the reasons women gave for not
wanting more children, it seems if the government were to cover or lessen the costs of providing
for and educating children, women would be more inclined to have additional children.
Women are also concerned about their job security and opportunities if they have more
children to raise. One way the government could address this would be to create “powerful social
safeguards… such as protecting the right of women to advance their careers despite the
additional burdens of childbirth and raising children.” (Cao et al., 2009, p. 373) While women’s
rights have made large advances in the past forty years or so in China, there is still room for
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improvement and ways that the government could encourage greater equality between men and
women.

44

Bibliography
Basten, S., & Jiang, Q. (2015). Fertility in China: An uncertain future. Population Studies,
69(S1), S97–S105. https://doi.org/10.1080/00324728.2014.982898
Bogg, L. (1998). Family Planning in China: Out of Control? American Journal of Public Health,
88(4), 649–652.
Cai, Y. (2010). China’s Below-Replacement Fertility: Government Policy or Socioeconomic
Development? Population and Development Review, 36(3), 419–440.
Cao, S., Tian, T., Qi, F., Ma, L., & Wang, G. (2010). An Investigation of Women’s Attitudes
Towards Fertility and China’s Family Planning Policy. Journal of Biosocial Science, 42,
359–375. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021932009990551
Chen, J., Liu, H., & Xie, Z. (2010). Effects of Rural-Urban Return Migration on Women’s
Family Planning and Reproductive Health Attitudes and Behavior in Rural China. Studies
in Family Planning, 41(1), 31–44.
Ding, Q. J., & Hesketh, T. (2006). Family size, fertility preferences, and sex ratio in China in the
era of the one child family policy: results from national family planning and reproductive
health survey. British Medical Journal, 333, 371–373.
https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.38775.672662.80
Guo, Z., Gietel-Basten, S., & Gu, B. (2019). The lowest fertility rates in the world? Evidence
from the 2015 Chinese 1% sample census. China Population and Development
Studies, 2(3), 245-258.
Greenhalgh, S., & Li, J. (1995). Engendering Reproductive Policy and Practice in Peasant China:
For a Feminist Demography of Reproduction. Signs, 20(3), 601–641.

45

Greenhalgh, S. (2001). Fresh Winds in Beijing: Chinese Feminists Speak Out on the One-Child
Policy and Women’s Lives. Signs, 26(3), 847–886.
Hardee, K., Xie, Z., & Gu, B. (2003). Family Planning and Women’s Lives in Rural China.
International Family Planning Perspectives, 30(2), 68–76.
Hesketh, T., Lu, L., & Zhu, W. X. (2005). The Effect of China’s One-Child Family Policy after
25 Years. New England Journal of Medicine, 353(11), 1171–1176.
Hinton, C. (1984). Small Happiness: Women of a Chinese Village. China. Retrieved from
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2kcPvggrn4M
Ng, D., & Tan, J. N. (2018). These are the “leftover men” of China, who just want to get
married. Retrieved from https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/cnainsider/leftover-menchina-get-married-gender-imbalance-one-child-policy10485358#:~:text=Referred%20to%20as%20China%27s
“leftover,of%20the%20book%20One%20Child.
White, T. (2003). Domination, resistance, and accommodation in China’s one-child campaign. In
Chinese Society: Change, Conflict, and Resistance (2nd ed., pp. 183–203).
Whyte, M. K., Feng, W., & Cai, Y. (2015). Challenging Myths About China’s One-Child Policy.
The China Journal, 74, 144–159.
World Bank, World Development Indicators. (2018). Fertility Rate in People’s Republic of
China [Data file]. Retrieved from
https://datacommons.org/tools/timeline#&place=country/CHN&statsVar=FertilityRate_Pers
on_Female
Yu, J., & Xie, Y. (2015). Changes in the determinants of marriage entry in post-reform urban
China. Demography, 52(6), 1869-1892.

46

Zhang, H. (2005). Bracing for An Uncertain Future: A Case Study of New Coping Strategies of
Rural Parents Under China’s Birth Control Policy. The China Journal, (54), 53–76.
Zhang, H. (2007). From Resisting to “Embracing?” the One-Child Rule: Understanding New
Fertility Trends in a Central China Village. The China Quarterly, 192, 855–875.
Zhang, J. (2017). The Evolution of China’s One-Child Policy and Its Effects on Family
Outcomes. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31(1), 141–160.

47

